A Note for Newcomers

My Observations are primarily intended for the benefit of individuals who work in or invest through the financial services industry. I have learned that such an audience strongly prefers an informal approach with a touch of irreverence and humor.

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Behavioral Economics -Disjunction Effect - what a groundhog and the super bowl have in common


Behavioral Economic studies have shown that people like to defer financial decisions until after anticipated information is disclosed even when that information is not relevant to the decision at hand.  Election and sporting event outcomes are good examples of irrelevant information causing the delayed implementation of financial decisions.  Overall this may help explain the rise in trading volume and price volatility immediately after such events. It turns out the "event" result did not and would not have changed how they decided, but they wait until the outcome because they will believe the outcome will provide them with valuable information to utilize in making their decision.

Related to this is something else.  Studies have also shown that people compulsively look for trends in data and conclude that there is a relationship between one occurrence and something else happening.   Statisticians understand that the occurrence between one event and another does not necessarily mean that there is a nexus between the two no matter how many times the two events occur in tandem.  If you are in the financial services industry you understand that for beta to be meaningful your r-squared has to be at a certain level (some put it at 70% or higher) otherwise the beta you observe is meaningless.

An illustration:

As a coin is flipped in succession, if the results are predominately one sided, say 5 out 6 are heads, virtually everyone will be inclined to think that within  the next  few tosses a "tails" is highly likely to come up given the previous results. In the parlance it's "due."  In reality the probability that a "tails" will come up on a toss is always 50-50 no matter what the previous record is, no matter how lop sided and no matter how extended it may become.

There is no connection (nexus) between the results of the previous tosses and the forthcoming toss and never will be. Yet we compulsively believe there is one.  Don't believe me?*  Can you say "Super bowl Effect?"  Bet you can't spell the town "Phil" comes from though. See at least one groundhog and the super bowl do have something in common, a myth about predicting the future.

You may wish to add the foregoing to your list of reasons why people are habitually a day late and a dollar short when making financial decisions*. They are waiting for an outcome of something which has nothing to do with the outcome of a decision they are contemplating.**

*two links you may find interesting:


** I cannot fail to mention Statten Island Chuck, General Beauregard Lee and Wiarton Willie. None of these groundhogs  will comment on this matter.  There is, of course, no doubt someone down at your local sports bar who will swear that there is a cause and effect between the outcome of the super bowl and the economy during the forthcoming year. My guess is that someone has bet heavily on the game and therefore the game's outcome will have an effect on his 2010 economic outcome.

Friday, January 22, 2010

A Piece of the Continent


Why hasn't top line growth occurred in American businesses. Perhaps we should revisit John Donne's famous essay. Cutting costs by firing people has consequences which cannot be avoided by anyone. In an effort to eliminate losses businesses have been reducing costs.  A material part of that effort has come in the form of what is referred to as “RIFs” or reductions in force.  On the face of it (except for those personally affected) it sounds like a good idea. Get those businesses more efficient so they can stem those losses and perhaps return to profitability. So intuitively it does sound like the right thing to do. Free market capitalism at work. Sever the employee, pay the severance, account for it, show that as a loss right now but thereafter show an improvement in your costs and thereby your profit.  You bet.  But show an improvement in your top line (revenues).  Absolutely not. Short sighted and stupid.


Let me suggest that contrary to intuition this is exactly what we should not be doing now.  Drill down a little bit and I believe that you will see that every action in that direction reduces aggregate demand including the demand for the goods and or services of the very business that engages in the action. Several hundred years ago, John Donne in his Mediation XVII* very articulately described the human predicament in this regard.


If it were just one concern that engaged in RIFs and other draconian expense cuts such actions would not materially effect aggregate demand and hence our economy (or that firm itself). That is simply not the case in a recession. It is on this basis that I propose that business efficiency efforts should be accomplished under normal market conditions and by firms that under such normal conditions need to do so**-not in an economic downturn.  You see you simply cannot act as if you are in a vacuum – you’re not.  Permit a simple example.  Suppose you have a Citi employee who has a Citi mortgage. Then suppose you RIF that employee. Does it matter if you alternatively change employers and lenders?  It does not.


We should advocate that during a recession, policy makers (both in the private and public sectors) engage in actions which are designed to prevent the deterioration of demand for the goods and services we produce – not encourage it. By way of example, making someone unemployed,  and by doing so making others afraid of the same consequence,  during a recession (and therefore likely unable to become reemployed) causes them to cease to be active participates in our economy as consumers – for all practical purposes they stop spending.  Such cost efficiency during a recession isn’t efficiency; it’s more akin to the purge cycle of Bulimia Nervosa. Just like the disease, the RIF (Purge) is not a cure for the condition; it’s an integral part of the condition.


The simple way to prevent this self fulfilling phenomenon is to engage in activity  during an economic downturn that reassures people that they will remain employed (perhaps at a diminished level of income).  We have not done that.  Instead what we have done is to adopt an all or none approach, RIF people during an economic downturn from businesses that in large part were efficiently employing people (both in number and activity) during a normal business environment. We then react by enacting policy to reemploy people in different jobs in different industries (thereby creating, among other problems, a massive need for retraining people for jobs that will not be permanently needed when the business environment returns to normal).


Once employees are RIF’d from a business that business may become efficient for the level of demand for its goods and services which existed at the time the RIF’s were planned.  It will not remain efficient if the level of demand changes and that most assuredly is what will happen.  More RIFs create more unemployed people and intensifies the fear in those remaining employed thereby further reducing demand.  Even after the economy hits its lowest point and although it may stay there for a period of time it will eventually improve and then those same businesses will become inefficient again, this time in the opposite direction.  Binge and Purge, Purge and Binge.


Indeed recently business commentators have been in essence echoing this sentiment. Many of them have cautioned that although we have seen improvement in corporate earnings that improvement has been only comparative (from disastrous to lousy) and not favorable in "real" terms.  They go on to say that cost cutting can only go so far in terms of reversing the economic outlook and that until there is real "topline" growth no real recovery will occur.  I agree. What I disagree with is that it was necessary to cut those costs in the manner and to the extent we did and were encouraged to do so. I might add that in terms of cutting costs in the near term by  RIFs is not in a real time cost savings.  Accounting rules which govern how we treat expenditures for severage packages exacerbate this unfourtunate tendancy.


We can enact policy initiatives which are no more expensive (and probably less) than the policy initiatives we currently have in place. The ones in place do not specifically target or encourage employee retention. Our policy initiatives can and should encourage businesses to retain employees which would be retained but for the recession.  If we do not change then we will continue the binge and purge cycles in our economy that so closely resemble the eating disorder I mentioned above.


In summary, making RIFs and taking draconian cost reductions during an economic downturn is worse that just being a day late and a dollar short.  It is a self fulfilling and self destructive phenomenon. Policy, both public and private should be to avoid this at all, excuse the pun, costs.




*In part here is Mediation XVII: “No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as any manner of thy friends or of thine own were; any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind.  And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.” 


Nunc Lento Sonitu Dicunt, Morieris


Yes I am aware that it's text is euro centric and sexist, however, the text was written for a contemporary audience n 1623.


**The domestic automotive industry is an example of an industry that was not efficient under normal market conditions.

Thursday, January 21, 2010

When you're at a "Buffett" pick up some food for thought


Portions of CNBC Transcript: Warren Buffett's 'Stock Split' Interview - Part Three: Kraft-Cadbury

Published: Wednesday, 20 Jan 2010 




In response to the reporter's comment that there is a great deal of uncertainty in today's economy and perhaps we should wait to invest when things are not so uncertain., Mr. Buffett had this to say:


 It doesn't make any sense to try and time things that way.  Nobody knows what's going to happen tomorrow, ever. The only thing is they get very apprehensive about it at certain times, particularly when other people are apprehensive.  When people get scared, they get scared as a group.  The confidence comes back sort of one at a time...



In response to the reporter's question on whether the  uncertainty about the near term future of a company should postpone  the purchase of the stock of that company Mr. Buffet stated:



The idea that you try to time purchases based on what you think business is going to do in the next year or two, I think that's the greatest mistake that investors make because it's always uncertain.  People say it's a time of uncertainty.  It was uncertain on September 10th, 2001, people just didn't know it.  It's uncertain every single day.  So take uncertainty as part of being involved in investment at all.  But uncertainty can be your friend.  I mean, when people are scared, they pay less for things.  We try to price.  We don't try to time at all.



Later in the interview the reporter stated that many consider that the market is currently overpriced and has diverged from the economy. Mr. Buffett responded:



 ..., I think markets frequently will diverge from the economy.  That's why I think it's a big mistake for people to start when they think about buying a stock, I think it's a big mistake to start, to think about what's going to happen in the next 12 months or the next six months either to the company or to the -- or to the economy generally.  I do not -- if I'm buying XYZ company I am not concerned about what they're going to earn in the next year. The next year is going to be over and then people are going to be looking at the year after that.  If I'm right about where they're going to be in five or ten years we'll make a lot of money but I can't time stocks based on what they're going to do this quarter and next quarter.  I don't know anybody else that can, but maybe they can.
In my view thats the difference between someone who can actually have a positive Alpha and people who try but can't for any length of time. 

Monday, January 18, 2010

Some things to think about when assessing risk



I reproduce an Observation I wrote in February 2008. I want to add to it but in order for me to make my point I need you to re-read the first one.

Some things to think about when assessing risk

First

“Risk” has two components:

          Probability (of occurrence); and

          Magnitude (of consequence).

          Examples –

… that an asteroid the size of New York City will hit the earth this summer.

… that a skunk will get squashed in the middle of the road (my favorite song) this summer.




Second

When people review a risk which has been realized they amplify their assessment of the probability of occurrence in proportion to the magnitude of the consequence. The bigger the consequence the more they amplify the probability.

          Example-

                             9/11/2001

The truth is that there is no correlation between the magnitude of consequence and the probability of occurrence.   It is very tempting to make that correlation but very wrong to do so.  One should assess each component separately.

Third

When something at risk does in fact occur, people experience a level of surprise.   The intensity of the emotional response of surprise depends largely on how unexpected the occurrence was. In large part this is dictated by the length of time since the last time the occurrence happened.  Long time big surprise, short time little or no surprise, never happened before and the surprise is a whopper. If it is a recurring event then the intensity the of the emotional reaction is directly related to the number of times a sequence occurred before the pattern was broken.

Fourth

Surprises can be negative or positive.  A negative surprise carries a lot more emotional impact than a positive surprise.


So when you have a negative event happen that has never happened before,  and the magnitude of consequence is very significant, every neuron in your brain is directed in a manner which causes you to want to conclude that the event was bound to happen when in fact it was not.

Finally

Keep those four points in mind as you assess a situation… “you don’t have to look and you don’t have to see cause you can feel it in your olfactory.”  Catchy tune that one.

          For those of you that don’t listen to country music occasionally you miss some very intellectual lyrics. “Crossin’ the highway late last night, he shoulda looked left and he shoulda looked right. He didn’t see the station wagon car; the skunk got squashed and there you are!                 -02/25//2008

Now for

Some things to think about when assessing risk (part two)

I looked at a portfolio last week for someone which clearly demonstrated the following-

Make no mistake either or both of the components of risk can have a negative consequence for you. Today the focus is on “magnitude of consequence.”  Let me give you an example. Say you build a portfolio with a bullet proof bond. For purposes of this discussion let’s call it twelve feet tall and bullet proof. The probability of occurrence (of a negative development) is, in fact, next to zero.  Now load that portfolio up with the bond – go ahead namby pamby – say 80 to 90 percent of the account.  Have you affected the probability of occurrence?* No you have not but you have affected the magnitude of consequence.  Trouble?  Can you say Lehman bonds (or structured notes)? To paraphrase another country song:  In default, in bankruptcy and (your) broken hearted.




So among other things diversification reduces risk because it lowers the magnitude of consequence. You may wish to consider this when managing your risk even when the probability of occurrence is next to ARS, I mean zero.

*     There are circumstances where concentration in a portfolio increases the probability of occurrence but I chose one example where it would not to place maximum emphasis on my point.                                                                                         

Monday, January 11, 2010

Myopic Loss Aversion - why clients say they told their broker they did not want any risk.






Why do clients, who have been riding along with investments for the long term, suddenly proclaim that they were not willing to take any risk when the markets and their investments have turned south?

Have you ever heard a client say "I told the broker I did not want any risk?" I bet those of you involved in dispute resolution have in mediation, arbitration, deposition or trial.  Even under oath they say it.

We know that brokerage firms do not (cannot- not even cash has no risk) sell anything that has "no risk" so most people might just be dubious about that client statement actually occurring.  Are they then intentionally making a false statement (under oath)? Probably not, at the time they later say they told the broker "they didn't want any risk" (add the phrase to their principle or leave it out - it doesn't matter) they may very well believe that they had in fact said just that.

How then do we explain the discrepancy?

The answer may lie in what behavioral economists call “Myopic Loss Aversion” (as opposed to ordinary Loss Aversion). Loss Aversion tells us that people are twice as upset about a potential loss of a certain size (say for example $10,000) than they are happy about a potential gain of the same size.  When an  unrealized loss becomes material, clients obsess - get  a myopic view - myopically focusing in on a short term time horizon, thus, you guessed it, myopically defining the "heretofore expressed" range (as in none) of permissible investment outcomes. The larger the loss relative to their view of their net worth the more powerful this myopia becomes. This myopia not only causes clients to focus on the immediate term but also to disregard other facts no longer deemed salient (such as what actually occurred during the conversation in question).

In other words when there is a material unrealized loss in a portfolio or investment, this phenomenon can cause folks to reverse their time horizon from long term to short (as in "immediate") term despite the fact that nothing in their lives would dictate that change objectively. This investment time horizon inversion is largely subconscious and compulsive.

You may wish to consider this as an investor.

If you are a financial services professional you may wish to improve your level of client communication especially when one of your clients has a material unrealized loss in their portfolio.

If you are in the dispute resolution business you may wish to reexamine the underlying facts with this phenomenon in mind.

On a somewhat analogous point, Financial Advisors can influence their clients without meaning to:

Investors given shorter term historical return data to review in connection with an investment portfolio discussion adopt more conservative investment strategies than Investors given longer term historical return data ( and vice versa).

Financial Advisors may wish to make sure that the term of the historical return data given to a client matches the real time horizon under consideration. Here are some links to professional papers: