A Note for Newcomers

My Observations are primarily intended for the benefit of individuals who work in or invest through the financial services industry. I have learned that such an audience strongly prefers an informal approach with a touch of irreverence and humor.

Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Behavioral Finance and Economics- Cognitive Distortions - Why Risk Disclosure May Not Sink In

"When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do sir?"


- John Maynard Keynes


Well let's explore the answer to his query a bit.


Did you ever wonder why investors tend to ignore warnings of risk in disclosure documents even after reading the warnings?


An obvious answer is that the disclosure document is too long or too complex or both.  That may be and that may be the answer to my question.  But it might also be something else.


You may wish to consider the following:


In my November 30th Observation I pointed out two human psychological tendencies described by Charlie Munger, Doubt Avoidance and Inconsistency Avoidance. I reproduce Munger's "Long Talk" descriptions below:


Doubt-Avoidance Tendency
The brain of man is programmed with a tendency to quickly remove doubt by reaching some decision.  It is easy to see how evolution would make animals, over the eons, drift toward such quick elimination of doubt.  After all, the one thing that is surely counterproductive for a prey animal that is threatened by a predator is to take a long time in deciding what to do.  And so man's Doubt Avoidance Tendency is quite consistent with the history of his ancient, nonhuman ancestors.


Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency
The brain of man conserves programming space by being reluctant to change, which is a form of inconsistency avoidance.  And so, people tend to accumulate large mental holdings of fixed conclusions and attitudes that are not often reexamined or changed, even though there is plenty of good evidence that they are wrong.


Munger goes on to describe the power of Doubt-Avoidance and its consequence (a quick decision about something).  He points out that society recognizes this problem and in some cases takes special care to see to it that it does not occur.


So pronounced is the tendency in man to quickly remove doubt by reaching some decision that behavior to counter the tendency is required from judges and jurors.  Here, delay before decision making is forced.


So when a broker first brings a potential investment to the attention of a client powerful psychological tendencies come forcefully into play.  First, as I mentioned in my Observation on December 15th a strong bond of trust develops (or is in place already) stretching from the client to the broker.  This bond of trust causes a cognitive distortion to occur in the client the net effect of which is to act as a factual input filter.  This filter lets in favorable information and excludes other (most importantly contradictory) information.  The filter stays in place as long as the bond of trust from the client to the broker continues to exist.


Second, the doubt avoidance tendency reinforces this bond of trust information filter.  In our scenario though there are no jury instructions given to a client to withhold judgment until all of the sources of information have been reviewed.  Even with an expression to the contrary (let me review the disclosure documents) the client has either made the investment decision or is primed to make it with significant cognitive distortions in place.


But we are not done yet with cognitive distortions.


The inconsistency avoidance tendency (at least as powerful as the other two) also comes into play.  This is another tendency that causes us to filter out non-confirmatory information we encounter.  Warren Buffett, Munger's partner, calls this the "First Conclusion Bias."  Mr. Buffett is often quoted (e.g. The Real Warren Buffett at p.210) in regard to the power of this tendency as he details Charles Darwin's method for defeating this bias.  According to Buffett, Darwin used to say that whenever he ran into something that contradicted one of his earlier conclusions, he would write down the new information within 30 minutes.  Otherwise his mind would soon work to reject the discordant information.


Now consider that the broker has presented the investment opportunity and perhaps given marketing materials to the client in connection with the presentation prior to the delivery of the disclosure documents.  These three tendencies are powerful forces for mere clients (as opposed to Darwin) to overcome when the disclosure documents do arrive.  All of these forces create cognitive distortions which act as filters causing the client to ignore or even reject risk disclosure in the disclosure documents which is not identical in detail and tenor to that initially conveyed explicitly or even implicitly by the broker.  This process occurs without the client's recognition that it has even happened. Blame our ancestors for that.


It would be amusing to watch Darwin read a disclosure document. I wonder how many of those little notebooks he would use up.
  

Tuesday, December 15, 2009







The Origin of My Observations


Sometime in the middle of 1986 a senior partner in my law firm approached me about working (on a temporary basis) at one of our biggest clients - then one of the largest and most respected NYSE brokerage firms. I was asked to serve as counsel to the CEO of a division of that firm. I politely said no, stating that I was happy moving up in the ranks of securities attorneys in my firm. Not long after that I was asked again and was informed that although it was a request, because of pressure from the client, it was not a request I should decline. So on September 1, 1986 I left the safe confines of my law firm and began what would become a long and fascinating career as an attorney embedded "in the field" in a full service wire house.









My division was on the "retail" side of the equation and that meant that I would be involved in dissecting what happened between retail brokers and retail clients. My nearest in-house attorney/colleague was two thousand miles away. I was, for all intents and purposes on my own, surrounded by thousands of folks on the business side.  People of all stripes, executives, managers, brokers, operations personnel, sales coordinators,  margin clerks-you name them. This was a world that I thought I knew but did not - not by a long shot. I would, however, learn a great deal because I was totally immersed in the retail brokerage environment.


 In part my job turned out to be that of a radio call in talk show host.  In that role I functioned more as an on air psychologist than I did as a lawyer.  We kept track of the number of calls the first two years and I had an average of 47 calls per work day. These calls often involved brokers, sales assistants, managers, and most importantly clients. I never returned to my law firm, for some reason it just never seemed an opportune time to do so. Eventually my employer was acquired by another financial services firm which in turn was acquired by another. This pattern continued until I ended up at one of the largest financial conglomerates in the world.


As the years passed I became fascinated with the question of "why." Why did the people involved (especially clients) act the way they did, say the things they said and decide the way they decided?  My curiosity only increased and in 1996 I read a law review article ("Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers," 84 Cal. L. Rev. 62 (1996)) by Professor Donald C. Langevoort. This article had some interesting (I would say fascinating but the article was just a bit dry) comments on the psychology of investors. I read and re-read that article and boiled it down to what I thought were the essential principles it discussed, wrote them down on a tablet and kept those comments in front of me and  in mind during the succeeding years.  During my phone calls and meetings I observed whether those comments turned out to have some validity.  I found many of them accurately described what I observed.   Here are a few of my "Observations:"


Hindsight Bias
This is the natural tendency of an individual (most importantly a client) to overweight the probability that an event (such as a loss on an investment) would occur after being told that the event had occurred. 

Net Worth
An individual's view of the value of their assets is not what they currently have but rather a mental picture of what they expect to have at some specific time in the future.

Loss Framing
When an individual ultimately perceives that they will not have the value of assets specified in their mental picture of their net worth they "frame" a "loss" and consider it as a realized loss rather than a potential failure to reach a goal.
  

Increase in Risk Assumption
An individual who frames such a loss often reacts by desiring to increase the level of risk in their investment portfolio to make up for the perceived loss.

Social Comparisons Increase Risk Assumption
Individuals engage in social comparisons in investing and increase the level of risk in their investment portfolio when they perceive that they are falling behind their peers in their investment performance.

Overconfidence
People exhibit overconfidence in their ability to predict future events leading to an underestimation of risk.


Self Esteem 
Self-esteem is a motivating factor in the investment arena.  Successes are attributed to the exercise of skill.  Failures are attributed to external causes.


Risk assessment 
Risk taken by an investor often takes the form of failing to perceive and appreciate the risk as opposed to its deliberate assumption.


Stress 
Mental recognition of risk causes stress.   Investors tend to avoid the perception of risk, and thereby avoid stress.



Trust
The transfer of trust to a financial advisor greatly reduces stress for investors.  To avoid stress investors often transfer significant, if not absolute, trust to the financial advisor.


Admitting Mistakes 
Once investors make a decision, changing direction implies that they have made a mistake.  Investors tend to filter out facts suggesting that they made a mistake, thereby avoiding the perception of risk and its consequent stress.


The selection of a financial advisor presents investors with the opportunity to assume the greatest amount of risk.  Investors often take advantage of the opportunity.


Once committed to the relationship with the financial advisor, investors will resist any notion that they are being exploited.  Entertaining suspicion would force the investor to reconsider their initial commitment, admit that perhaps they made a mistake, perceive risk and incur stress.


Contrary feedback must be immediate and unambiguous to overcome an investor’s resistance to a contemporaneous admission that they made a mistake.


Eventually, however, if loss-framing occurs the investor’s prior resistance will be overcome.  At that point the investor will conclude that their trust has been breached, and begin to complain, often criticizing (long) past investments and their dealings with the financial advisor (even while the FA was at prior firms).      
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By no means is that a complete list of or discussion about what I observed. I will have more to say in future Observations.  

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

An Alternative Approach to Case Management


Controlling the cost of litigation, arbitration or dispute resolution is for the corporate client not unlike the dilemma our country faces with the task of controlling healthcare costs. There doesn’t seem to be a workable solution. No matter what approach we have tried costs have not been effectively controlled. Solve one aspect of the problem and a brand new aspect pops up. The law of unintended consequences has been hard at work. I have often been reminded of the use of a toy I had as a child. The toy was a small bench with pegs and a mallet. We all had them. We beat the pegs down on one side then turned the bench over and there were those pegs sticking up all over again. The process of beating down on the pegs was repeated over and over again despite the fact that there was no solution.   A child was only afforded the opportunity to try and find one and oh yes, the repeated opportunity to use a mallet to beat something thoroughly without getting into trouble. Children (of all ages) love this toy. Beating down on something continuously works for entertaining a child; it does not work for solving the problem of controlling the cost of dispute resolution.

           
            Many tactics have been tried in an effort to control the costs of dispute resolution.  I was in the corporate law department of one of the largest corporations in the world for 23 years and I saw a great number of them but even I can’t begin to catalogue (or for that matter recount) all the tactics that have been tried. Regulating the amount and manner outside legal counsel bill has been the most popular overall approach. Corporate legal departments have developed extensive polices in excruciating detail all designed to control costs.  They have failed because each attempt to control some aspect of legal billing simply created other cost causing problems to occur.  If the number of restrictions became too extensive or too minute the restrictions were ignored by in-house counsel/controllers or outside counsel (sometimes referred to as out-house counsel – but not by me) or both. Restrictions involved the hourly rates charged, the number of assigned counsel, expenses or charges incurred from things such as the use of taxis to the cost of copying, faxing, and so on and so on. We had approved lists of lawyers who agreed to discount their fees, agreements for flat fees, for flat fees with kickers and penalties, for blended rates – you name it.  When I think about all the ways that were introduced I just start laughing, or I would if it were funny, but it’s not.

            The solution to controlling the cost of the other component of the problem, the cost of the solution (ex legal fees and costs) has been equally elusive.  Principally the solution has been to hire lawyers that can out lawyer the other side.  When I think of that tactic I think of the scene in the movie Men in Black where the character played by Will Smith is sitting in his egg chair and a nice young (brilliant no doubt) officer stands up and demonstrably and ever so earnestly proclaims that the group of potential agents gathered there are “the best, of the best, of the best – sir!” Do I have to describe Mr. Smith’s reaction? If I had to use one word, that word would be sarcastically cynical. It was not uncommon for me to be in conversation with outside lawyers who were double Yalies or that other school to the north, or maybe they went to one and then the other.  Great. Sometimes it was Mr/s. Magic, the lawyer who could be counted on to never lose.  Funny thing was though the costs of resolution didn’t go down with the magic lawyer or the double Yalies or both.

            Now why is it that we have not lowered or even controlled the costs of dispute resolution despite extraordinarily creative controls on counsel and the selection of the best of the best, of the best?   The answer is to say that if the problem were a horse, we have been approaching it at the wrong end.

            Perhaps an explanation is in order.  When we finish a case and get a good result (or a bad result for that matter) by decision or settlement we in effect throw away what we paid for.  We tuck the files away, congratulate each other (or swear never to hire that lawyer/law firm again) and then we are done with it.  There have been some half hearted attempts to learn from cases but nothing effective or substantial on a system wide basis. Neither inside nor outside counsel were motivated to do something effective with what in reality,  is the real asset we purchased.

            Lawyers are first and foremost analysts. Ultimately what we pay for is the analysis of counsel, not advocacy.  Yet advocacy is what we think we are buying. In truth lawyers are modest at public speaking which is all right because the real help lawyers can give us comes in successfully analyzing the facts and law and telling us the results of their analysis.  Trial lawyers often talk about success at trial hinging on the development of a successful theme for trial and conveying that theme to the judge or jury.  I suggest that a successful theme is nothing more than the correct analysis of the facts and law.

            When I state that we throw away what we paid for I don’t mean we don’t utilize this analysis, we do – in the resolution of the case at hand.  We don’t use it to save costs effectively (a point I think I have pounded sufficiently). The real way to save costs is by learning not to do “it” again. The perspective in approaching a dispute is backward (hence the analogy to the approach of the wrong end of a horse).  We think that it is the solution of this case that should be emphasized and that is so very wrong.  To save costs I propose that we speak to the other end of the horse and teach the horse not to do “it” again. Therein lies the solution to controlling costs, reverse the emphasis.

            In 1990 I did just that for my firm. It so happened that in January of that year I was reassigned from the law department to a business unit that had a terrible problem with disputes of all kinds. Disputes with clients, with vendors, with employees, you name the category and we were getting into that kind of a dispute with that kind of person. Based on an industry study we were the worst in terms of the costs of dispute resolution. I was given the task of ending that problem, quickly, or else.  I describe the system that I came up with in the paragraphs that follow, a system that was successful (dropping overall costs by 90 percent within a year). The secret to my system was its 180 degree reversal of its emphasis.  I am not saying that the construct of my system is the best but I am saying that the direction it approached cost control for dispute resolution was head and shoulders above anything else I have seen.  I took all of my resources including outside counsel and business partners, pounded away and constructed what at the end of the day was a feedback loop to the business. Because we tracked and accumulated that feedback information it increased its power to positively affect business practices.  In effect the system became a feedback pipeline which lowered costs of dispute resolution by a factor that was not anticipated, even by the system's architect.

            In order to adequately describe the system it is necessary to discuss certain components and describe their significance. Others that worked with me in the operation of the system disagree but I think the keystone of the system was what we came to call the “Letter.” At the end of the resolution of each dispute the lawyer assigned to “hands on” handle the matter was required to write a letter to me. The form and content of the letter were strictly controlled.  The Letter had to starkly state what we did wrong that caused the dispute to arise and what we did wrong that caused the specific resolution result.  Counsel was not allowed to take evidentiary problems (such as the existence or lack of documents or witnesses) into account.  The Letter had to describe the ultimate, down and dirty, bottom of the barrel, operative facts as to the underlying dispute and our initial reaction to the dispute once it was brought to our attention. It had to be less than a page and a half in length. It also had to suggest how we should have done things. I was brutal in rejecting proffered Letters that I did not feel were sufficiently well thought out or sufficiently frank or succinct.  Final bills were not paid until I accepted the Letter. I ran this aspect of the program with an iron fist, one with a mallet in it.

            Without the proper preparation and emphasis the quality of the Letters simply would not have been good enough to have an effect on costs.  The preparation and emphasis that did occur resulted from the structure of the system we put in place to assign and supervise the dispute from initial receipt through resolution.

            In designing the system I drew on my experience as a young associate lawyer in private practice.  In those days I was assigned the task of carrying the boxes and briefcases which held the documents necessary to try a case to court.  The courthouse I visited most often was an elegant courthouse in Denver, Colorado.  Its hallways were extremely spacious and along the walls of the hallways were wooden benches where people could sit while waiting to enter a courtroom.  Since I was the junior lawyer assigned to the case I was not encouraged to talk to our client at that point.  I was expected to make sure the boxes and documents were where they were supposed to be and on time.  I was then expected to be a loyal assistant to the lead attorney on logistical matters.  As a result when not engaged in hauling documents I was able to observe the goings on in the hallways of the courthouse.  What I learned helped me design my system. Far more often than not upon arrival outside the designated courtroom the lead trial lawyer for a client would sit the client down on a bench just outside the courtroom away from people but often in full view of the jury pool (for the case) which was usually huddled in the hall waiting to go into the courtroom when called by the bailiff.

            The lawyer would then have the “moment of truth” talk with the client.  The client, while listening to the lawyer, would be looking at the members of the jury pool and having heart palpitations. What the lawyer said sunk in with the client like never before.  This was it, put up or shut up.

            Given that we had a trailing docket in Denver, cases took a very long time (years) to come to trial and I often thought watching this moment of truth talk go on, what a tragedy this event had to happen so late in the process.  It would be best if it could happen with the same impact early in the process.  With that thought in mind I came up with my case management system.

            Under my system each case or dispute was logged in on a spreadsheet and for all but trivial disputes a “hands on” lawyer was assigned to handle the matter.  The “hands on” lawyer and the business head responsible for the unit that “owned” the dispute were then connected in a conference call with me. No such call would go forward without both people on the line. The reason for that requirement was that each person needed to hear what I was telling them and know that the other person was hearing the same thing at the same time.  I ran the call and during the call we agreed on an agenda of events.  The lawyer was informed that s/he was given two weeks to review the file, preliminarily review documents and conduct interviews as s/he would like and then carefully prepare a budget for the cost of completing the trial of the dispute. Counsel was not given a list of billing restrictions but simply informed that the construction of a budget proposal was up to her/him and that my business partner and I would decide whether we could afford the budget.1  We scheduled the date and time for a second conference call to discuss and agree on the budget.   At the same time we scheduled a third conference call, to be 60 days after the second call.  This third call was very important and I stressed to counsel it was to be approached with meticulous preparation. In preparation for the call counsel was to review documents and interview witnesses as they deemed appropriate to permit them to answer certain specific questions.  In my system this call was called the “60 day call.”  The call was very structured.  Each call began with counsel telling us the answer to three questions I had identified in my first call (a) what’s it going to cost to try this case from here on out – no explanation of the figure was permitted at that point of the discussion (b) were we going to win or lose at trial and anything but a defense verdict was defined as a loss and (c) if we were to lose, what would be the most probable size of an award and what was the highest and lowest award we could reasonably expect. The dates of the previous calls and the 60 day call were recorded in our spreadsheets and so were the answers to these questions as well as the budget figure given by counsel.

            At this point in the 60 day call counsel was permitted a brief recitation of the case and then was permitted to tell the business head in a succinct manner “here is what is going to help you, here is what is going to hurt you and here is why its going to come out the way I stated.”  This was a very formal call; no idle chat was tolerated or permitted.  Counsel had been told of the structure and requirements of the 60 day call and had been warned to be prepared.  In doing so I was able to have my courthouse chat with the business head under conditions that approached those faced by the client when staring at the jury pool.

            The business head was then allowed to ask questions and probe a little.  They did and counsel was totally prepared to meet and answer those questions almost as if they were on that bench, ready to go in that courtroom and try the case.  Counsel was asked to indicate fees and expenses incurred to the date of the call.  I indicated the balance left of the budget and reiterated something I had earlier said and that was, that the budget was not meant to be in effect a turn key price for representation but that the budget would be followed.  If it needed to be revised then counsel was to contact me and we would agree on an adjustment with the business head.  I warned counsel that absent such a call and agreement charges which exceeded the budget would not be paid. During the 60 day call or at any time when it came to our attention that the budget needed to be revised (for any reason) my business head could decide that trial could not be afforded if a reasonable settlement was possible.2  At the conclusion of the 60 day call we were ready to discuss our plan for the resolution of the matter.  If that plan included possible settlement as it most often did I had a meticulously prepared lawyer and a fully briefed business partner involved in the development of our settlement plan.  All of this was accomplished only a little over 10 weeks after the case was logged in.3 The plan of action, including settlement as well as any settlement authority granted in the call were logged in to our spreadsheet. Counsel was then asked to schedule any calls that s/he deemed necessary as the case progressed.

            As I have previously mentioned, as each case progressed and then was disposed of we tracked the information we gathered on an episodic, cumulative and trend basis. As a result all kinds of feedback information became available in addition to the information conveyed in the final Letter from counsel.  By way of example once this program had been in place I was able to do some forecasting4 for my business unit including the rate at which disputes would accrue under normal conditions and the overall cost of disputes in a future time frame. In addition we were able to use the tracked information to evaluate the efficiency of counsel5 and well the accuracy of initial budget proposals and the answers to the 60 day call questions.  Outside counsel proved to be extraordinarily accurate in their predictions and highly efficient (when properly motivated).  In just two years I was able to reduce my business unit’s dispute resolution costs by 90 percent.




1.  When you buy a significant item do you really care how much a component costs?  No you care how     much the item costs. If outside counsel wants to get the business with an acceptable budget proposal (knowing that their budgets are being compared with those of other counsel) they will take care to exclude all the “fluffery” for you – amazing.

2.  We had in house and outside counsel operate as hands on counsel.  The system was adjusted slightly for the lack of fees that would be charged should a case be handled by inside counsel.  It became apparent less than year after the system was implemented that the effectiveness of the system was not affected by the selection of inside or outside counsel. I argued somewhat unsuccessfully that with this system in place it was unnecessary to carry a large staff of in house hands on attorneys.  In my view they were a fixed and not a variable cost and therefore less desirable.  I believe institutional inertia was the real reason for the reaction to my argument.

3.  As my department received each bill from outside counsel the amount of fees payable and the amount of costs incurred by counsel on our behalf were separately recorded on appropriate portions of our spreadsheet. The total bill was recorded as well.  We tracked this information among other ways, versus the budget. Outside counsel at first asked us to inform them of the “balance” but then began to track it themselves.  This later development was in effect a self policing action on the part of outside counsel and in my view dramatically improved the quality of original budgets that were submitted. It was also a development that I had not anticipated.


4.  We quickly determined that our settlement tactics became much more successful. Not only were our settlement tactics based on a more complete analysis of the facts and law and an educated and motivated client but we arrived at that state before our, if you will, adversary.

5.  I conducted a review of one aspect of the system for the general counsel of my firm. After the first several 60day calls we determined that we could set a reserve during the call under FASB 5.  We began to do so.  Setting a reserve at that point exponentially decreased the resistance my business partner had to authorizing a settlement amount. In fact it dramatically improved settlement discussions and the determination of tactics.  As a result the reserve setting discussion was advanced during the call and occurred immediately after the three questions were asked and the briefing and question period had terminated.


6.  Efficiency here relates to accuracy of budgetary and outcome projections and to comparative costs of outside counsel. To further improve efficiency we let counsel know how “efficient” they were.